

Public Employee Retirement Benefits

Background and Policy Principles



Legislative Analyst's Office

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Presentation Outline

- Pensions
- Retiree Health
- Principles for Pension and Retiree Health Policy
- Responding to Commissioners' Questions

Public Employee Pensions

- **Governments typically pay for estimated future costs of benefits *as they accrue*.**
 - Pension prefunding: consistent public policy for generations in California at the state and local level.
 - Minimizes unfunded liabilities, or future taxpayers' costs to pay for compensating today's public servants.
 - Voter-approved constitutional provisions facilitate pension prefunding.

Pension Prefunding: Established Public Policy in California

- **Commission on Pensions of State Employees (1929)**
 - Commission report: “An urgent responsibility rests upon the state to see that any retirement system which it may sponsor is placed upon a sound financial basis, where liabilities are provided for as they are *incurred*, rather than when they mature.”
- **Proposition 5 (1930)**
 - Authorized state employee pensions.
 - Ballot argument referenced prefunding as the “proper method” of financing pensions.

Pension Prefunding: Established Public Policy in California *(Continued)*

- **Over time, voter support for pension systems to generate greater returns from prefunding assets.**
 - 1966 and 1970: Stock investments authorized.
 - 1984: Even broader investment authority.
 - ▣ Ballot argument: Will help “keep benefits up and costs down.”
 - 1992: Stop “raids” of pension funds by elected officials.

Today, California's Pension Systems Are Substantially Funded

- **Largest 15 systems account for over 90 percent of all systems' assets.**
 - On average, about 88 percent of liabilities are funded for these systems.
 - ▣ Funded ratios range from 72 percent to 108 percent.
 - For more information, see Appendix A.

For Defined Benefit Pensions, Prefunding Is Desirable

- **Minimizes taxpayer and employee costs.**
 - “Over the past 10 years, approximately 75 percent of the income used to pay [CalPERS] pension benefits came from investment earnings, not employee or employer contributions.” —CalPERS policy brief, 2006.
- **Helps governments keep benefit promises made to retired employees.**

Public Pension Contributions Stabilizing After a Volatile Period


- **Unprecedented investment success led to sharp contribution declines in late 1990s.**
- **In the early 2000s, contributions skyrocketed.**
 - In many cases, caused principally by stock declines.
 - Benefit increases and other factors also contributed.
- **More stability in recent years.**
 - Successful investments.
 - Limited benefit enhancements.
 - Implementation of “rate stabilization” policies.

Retiree Health Benefits: A Growing Cost for Government

- **Most California public employers offer retiree health benefits.**
- **In the past, manageable governmental costs.**
- **Rapidly rising costs in recent years.**
 - Rapid premium growth.
 - Increased retiree longevity.
 - Many more retirees.

State's Pay-As-You-Go Retiree Health Costs Are Climbing Rapidly

In Millions



^aEstimated.

^bProposed spending from all funds, including off-budget items.

Public Sector Accounting Rules Catch up to the Private Sector

- **Public sector financial statements have listed pension liabilities for decades.**
- **1990: Corporate accounting rules require calculation of retiree health liabilities.**
- **2007: Public sector accounting rules begin to require reporting of retiree health liabilities.**
 - For large governmental entities: beginning in 2007-08 financial statements (which will be released in late 2008 or early 2009).


With Little Prefunding, Unfunded Liabilities Often Will Be Massive

- **State Government and California State University**
 - \$40 billion to \$70 billion (2006 LAO estimate).
- **University of California**
 - \$7.6 billion (2006 estimate).
- **Counties**
 - May be over \$25 billion, according to valuation information known to date.
- **Los Angeles Unified School District**
 - \$10 billion (valuation released in February 2006).

How Can Governments and Employee Groups Address the Liabilities?

- There are **two** general strategies.
 - Use prefunding to cover future benefit costs.
 - Change benefits so as to reduce future benefit costs.
- There are many options to implement these strategies.
 - “Full prefunding?” “Partial prefunding?”
 - Many options to change benefits, particularly for future hires.
 - ▣ The ability to modify benefits for current and past workers may be limited *if* the workers have vested benefit rights.

Prefunding: Costs More Now, Costs Less Later



Prefunding: Costs More Now, Costs Less Later

(Continued)

- **Full prefunding—the annual amount to retire liabilities in 30 years—is expensive.**
 - The choices often will not be easy ones.
 - ▣ Revenue increases.
 - ▣ Use funds that otherwise would go to programs.
- **Delays in reducing liabilities may lead to even tougher choices in the future.**

Changing Benefits: Many Options Exist

- **Most options involve shifting costs or financial risks to retirees.**
 - Increasing premiums, copayments, deductibles, etc.
 - Changing eligibility criteria.
 - Reducing “implicit subsidy” paid as part of active employees’ health premiums.
 - Defined contribution retiree health plans.
 - Many other options exist.

Changing Benefits: Many Options Exist

(Continued)

- **Proposed reforms of the health care system also seek to change benefit delivery, thereby reducing future costs.**
 - Reforms that slow future growth of premiums or other employer payments undoubtedly would help.
 - However, actuarial valuations assume that premium growth in the future will be much less than it is now.
 - ▣ Therefore, unless health care reform succeeds, public employer liabilities may turn out to be *much more* than currently estimated.

Establishing Principles for Public Retirement Policy

- **Pension and retiree health benefits are alike in several important respects.**
 - Deferred compensation earned during employee's working life.
 - Typically, both are *defined benefits*.
 - Future costs can be estimated through actuarial valuations.
 - Both can result in unfunded liabilities that may have to be paid by future taxpayers.

Establishing Principles for Public Retirement Policy *(Continued)*

- We recommend that the Legislature adhere to several general principles when setting policy for public employee pension and retiree health benefits.
- These principles would produce benefits for both the public and public employees.

Principle: Benefits Should Be Considered As a Part of Overall Compensation

- **Governments and employee groups should be able to bargain in good faith to set retirement benefits.**
- **Benefits:**
 - Flexibility for governments and employee groups to agree to changes in benefits.
 - One size does not fit all. Different employers and employee groups have different needs.

Principle: Pay for Estimated Benefit Costs as Benefits Accrue

- **Governments should adhere to long-term funding strategies designed to address likely costs of future defined benefit payments.**
- **Annual payment of “normal costs” by employers and/or employees is needed, at a minimum.**
 - Exception: Rare (and usually temporary) instances when liabilities are substantially overfunded.
- **Benefits:**
 - Avoids shifting operating costs to future taxpayers.
 - Reduces costs in the long run.
 - Helps governments provide promised benefits.

Principle: Unfunded Liabilities Need to Be Addressed

- The policy of *every level of government* should be to minimize unfunded liabilities over the long run—both for pensions and retiree health.
- May take many years of funding to address initial reported retiree health liabilities.
 - Similar to the many years it took to build substantially funded pension systems.
- **Benefits:**
 - Reduces costs in the long run.
 - Helps governments provide promised benefits.

Principle: Public Benefits Require Transparency

- **Collective bargaining agreements, laws, and employee/retiree documents need to be clear about employer obligations.**
- **Example: Can benefits be changed in the future or not?**
- **Benefits:**
 - Facilitates financial planning by employers and employees alike.
 - Prevents future judicial disputes.

Principle: Adhere to Long-Term Retirement Funding Strategies

- **Long-term strategies rely on strong investment years offsetting the inevitable weak investment years.**
 - Unexpected investment gains often are followed by unexpected losses.
 - “Stock market bubbles” tend to burst.
- **Be cautious about enhancing benefits based on short-term investment gains.**

Conclusion: Future Risks Point to the Need for Action

- **Demographic and economic risks heighten the importance of tackling existing liabilities beginning now.**
 - GAO: Social Security and Medicare benefits are unsustainable.
 - Medical advances may lengthen life expectancy more and increase retirement costs.
 - The “Baby Boom.”
 - ▣ Unprecedented changes in pension system demographics.

Questions



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Appendix A

In Billions

Retirement System ^a	Actuarial Asset Value	Unfunded Liabilities	Percent of Liabilities Funded	Valuation Date
California Public Employees' Retirement System ^b	\$183.7	26.6	87.3%	6/30/2005
California State Teachers' Retirement System	121.9	20.3	85.7	6/30/2005
University of California Retirement Plan	42.0	—	104.1	6/30/2006
Los Angeles County Employees Retirement Association	32.8	3.4	90.5	6/30/2006
San Francisco Employees' Retirement System	12.7	—	107.6	6/30/2005
Los Angeles Fire and Police Pension Plan	12.1	0.7	94.6	6/30/2006
Los Angeles City Employees' Retirement System	7.7	2.2	77.8	6/30/2006
Los Angeles Water and Power Employees' Retirement Plan	6.4	0.6	91.5	7/1/2006
San Diego County Employees Retirement Association	6.2	1.2	83.6	6/30/2006
Orange County Employees Retirement System	5.8	2.3	71.5	12/31/2005
San Bernardino County Employees' Retirement Association	5.2	0.4	92.0	6/30/2006
Sacramento County Employees' Retirement System	4.8	0.4	93.0	6/30/2006
Contra Costa County Employees' Retirement Association	4.1	0.7	84.8	12/31/2005
San Diego City Employees' Retirement System ^c	4.0	1.0	79.9	6/30/2006
Alameda County Employees' Retirement Association	3.8	0.8	83.2	12/31/2005

^a Largest defined benefit public pension programs (as reported by the State Controller), which include over 90 percent of all systems' assets.

^b The system also presents funding information based on the market value of assets.

^c Includes only assets and liabilities for the City of San Diego, one of three plan sponsors.

