

# Public Employee Retirement Benefits

Background and Policy Principles



**Legislative Analyst's Office**

Presented to: Public Employee Post-Employment Benefits Commission  
April 26, 2007

[www.lao.ca.gov/retireehealth](http://www.lao.ca.gov/retireehealth)



# Presentation Outline

---

- Pensions
- Retiree Health
- Principles for Pension and Retiree Health Policy
- Responding to Commissioners' Questions

# Public Employee Pensions

---

- **Governments typically pay for estimated future costs of benefits *as they accrue*.**
  - Pension prefunding: consistent public policy for generations in California at the state and local level.
  - Minimizes unfunded liabilities, or future taxpayers' costs to pay for compensating today's public servants.
  - Voter-approved constitutional provisions facilitate pension prefunding.

# Pension Prefunding: Established Public Policy in California

---

- **Commission on Pensions of State Employees (1929)**
  - Commission report: “An urgent responsibility rests upon the state to see that any retirement system which it may sponsor is placed upon a sound financial basis, where liabilities are provided for as they are *incurred*, rather than when they mature.”
- **Proposition 5 (1930)**
  - Authorized state employee pensions.
  - Ballot argument referenced prefunding as the “proper method” of financing pensions.

# Pension Prefunding: Established Public Policy in California *(Continued)*

---

- **Over time, voter support for pension systems to generate greater returns from prefunding assets.**
  - 1966 and 1970: Stock investments authorized.
  - 1984: Even broader investment authority.
    - ▣ Ballot argument: Will help “keep benefits up and costs down.”
  - 1992: Stop “raids” of pension funds by elected officials.

# Today, California's Pension Systems Are Substantially Funded

---

- **Largest 15 systems account for over 90 percent of all systems' assets.**
  - On average, about 88 percent of liabilities are funded for these systems.
    - ▣ Funded ratios range from 72 percent to 108 percent.
  - For more information, see Appendix A.

# For Defined Benefit Pensions, Prefunding Is Desirable

---

- **Minimizes taxpayer and employee costs.**
  - “Over the past 10 years, approximately 75 percent of the income used to pay [CalPERS] pension benefits came from investment earnings, not employee or employer contributions.” —CalPERS policy brief, 2006.
- **Helps governments keep benefit promises made to retired employees.**

# Public Pension Contributions Stabilizing After a Volatile Period

---

- **Unprecedented investment success led to sharp contribution declines in late 1990s.**
- **In the early 2000s, contributions skyrocketed.**
  - In many cases, caused principally by stock declines.
  - Benefit increases and other factors also contributed.
- **More stability in recent years.**
  - Successful investments.
  - Limited benefit enhancements.
  - Implementation of “rate stabilization” policies.


# Retiree Health Benefits: A Growing Cost for Government

---

- **Most California public employers offer retiree health benefits.**
- **In the past, manageable governmental costs.**
- **Rapidly rising costs in recent years.**
  - Rapid premium growth.
  - Increased retiree longevity.
  - Many more retirees.

# State's Pay-As-You-Go Retiree Health Costs Are Climbing Rapidly

In Millions



<sup>a</sup>Estimated.

<sup>b</sup>Proposed spending from all funds, including off-budget items.

# Public Sector Accounting Rules Catch up to the Private Sector

---

- **Public sector financial statements have listed pension liabilities for decades.**
- **1990: Corporate accounting rules require calculation of retiree health liabilities.**
- **2007: Public sector accounting rules begin to require reporting of retiree health liabilities.**
  - For large governmental entities: beginning in 2007-08 financial statements (which will be released in late 2008 or early 2009).

# With Little Prefunding, Unfunded Liabilities Often Will Be Massive

---


- **State Government and California State University**
  - \$40 billion to \$70 billion (2006 LAO estimate).
- **University of California**
  - \$7.6 billion (2006 estimate).
- **Counties**
  - May be over \$25 billion, according to valuation information known to date.
- **Los Angeles Unified School District**
  - \$10 billion (valuation released in February 2006).

# How Can Governments and Employee Groups Address the Liabilities?

---

- There are **two** general strategies.
  - Use prefunding to cover future benefit costs.
  - Change benefits so as to reduce future benefit costs.
- There are many options to implement these strategies.
  - “Full prefunding?” “Partial prefunding?”
  - Many options to change benefits, particularly for future hires.
    - ▣ The ability to modify benefits for current and past workers may be limited *if* the workers have vested benefit rights.

# Prefunding: Costs More Now, Costs Less Later



# Prefunding: Costs More Now, Costs Less Later

---

*(Continued)*

- **Full prefunding—the annual amount to retire liabilities in 30 years—is expensive.**
  - The choices often will not be easy ones.
    - ▣ Revenue increases.
    - ▣ Use funds that otherwise would go to programs.
- **Delays in reducing liabilities may lead to even tougher choices in the future.**

# Changing Benefits: Many Options Exist

---

- **Most options involve shifting costs or financial risks to retirees.**
  - Increasing premiums, copayments, deductibles, etc.
  - Changing eligibility criteria.
  - Reducing “implicit subsidy” paid as part of active employees’ health premiums.
  - Defined contribution retiree health plans.
  - Many other options exist.

# Changing Benefits: Many Options Exist

(Continued)

- **Proposed reforms of the health care system also seek to change benefit delivery, thereby reducing future costs.**
  - Reforms that slow future growth of premiums or other employer payments undoubtedly would help.
  - However, actuarial valuations assume that premium growth in the future will be much less than it is now.
    - ▣ Therefore, unless health care reform succeeds, public employer liabilities may turn out to be *much more* than currently estimated.

# Establishing Principles for Public Retirement Policy

---

- **Pension and retiree health benefits are alike in several important respects.**
  - Deferred compensation earned during employee's working life.
  - Typically, both are *defined benefits*.
  - Future costs can be estimated through actuarial valuations.
  - Both can result in unfunded liabilities that may have to be paid by future taxpayers.

# Establishing Principles for Public Retirement Policy *(Continued)*

---

- We recommend that the Legislature adhere to several general principles when setting policy for public employee pension and retiree health benefits.
- These principles would produce benefits for both the public and public employees.

# Principle: Benefits Should Be Considered As a Part of Overall Compensation

---

- **Governments and employee groups should be able to bargain in good faith to set retirement benefits.**
- **Benefits:**
  - Flexibility for governments and employee groups to agree to changes in benefits.
  - One size does not fit all. Different employers and employee groups have different needs.

# Principle: Pay for Estimated Benefit Costs as Benefits Accrue

---

- **Governments should adhere to long-term funding strategies designed to address likely costs of future defined benefit payments.**
- **Annual payment of “normal costs” by employers and/or employees is needed, at a minimum.**
  - Exception: Rare (and usually temporary) instances when liabilities are substantially overfunded.
- **Benefits:**
  - Avoids shifting operating costs to future taxpayers.
  - Reduces costs in the long run.
  - Helps governments provide promised benefits.

# Principle: Unfunded Liabilities Need to Be Addressed

---

- The policy of *every level of government* should be to minimize unfunded liabilities over the long run—both for pensions and retiree health.
- May take many years of funding to address initial reported retiree health liabilities.
  - Similar to the many years it took to build substantially funded pension systems.
- **Benefits:**
  - Reduces costs in the long run.
  - Helps governments provide promised benefits.

# Principle: Public Benefits Require Transparency

---

- **Collective bargaining agreements, laws, and employee/retiree documents need to be clear about employer obligations.**
- **Example: Can benefits be changed in the future or not?**
- **Benefits:**
  - Facilitates financial planning by employers and employees alike.
  - Prevents future judicial disputes.

# Principle: Adhere to Long-Term Retirement Funding Strategies

---

- **Long-term strategies rely on strong investment years offsetting the inevitable weak investment years.**
  - Unexpected investment gains often are followed by unexpected losses.
  - “Stock market bubbles” tend to burst.
- **Be cautious about enhancing benefits based on short-term investment gains.**

# Conclusion: Future Risks Point to the Need for Action

---

- **Demographic and economic risks heighten the importance of tackling existing liabilities beginning now.**
  - GAO: Social Security and Medicare benefits are unsustainable.
  - Medical advances may lengthen life expectancy more and increase retirement costs.
  - The “Baby Boom.”
    - ▣ Unprecedented changes in pension system demographics.

# Questions



[www.lao.ca.gov/retireehealth](http://www.lao.ca.gov/retireehealth)

# Appendix A

## In Billions

Retirement System <sup>a</sup>	Actuarial Asset Value	Unfunded Liabilities	Percent of Liabilities Funded	Valuation Date
California Public Employees' Retirement System <sup>b</sup>	\$183.7	26.6	87.3%	6/30/2005
California State Teachers' Retirement System	121.9	20.3	85.7	6/30/2005
University of California Retirement Plan	42.0	—	104.1	6/30/2006
Los Angeles County Employees Retirement Association	32.8	3.4	90.5	6/30/2006
San Francisco Employees' Retirement System	12.7	—	107.6	6/30/2005
Los Angeles Fire and Police Pension Plan	12.1	0.7	94.6	6/30/2006
Los Angeles City Employees' Retirement System	7.7	2.2	77.8	6/30/2006
Los Angeles Water and Power Employees' Retirement Plan	6.4	0.6	91.5	7/1/2006
San Diego County Employees Retirement Association	6.2	1.2	83.6	6/30/2006
Orange County Employees Retirement System	5.8	2.3	71.5	12/31/2005
San Bernardino County Employees' Retirement Association	5.2	0.4	92.0	6/30/2006
Sacramento County Employees' Retirement System	4.8	0.4	93.0	6/30/2006
Contra Costa County Employees' Retirement Association	4.1	0.7	84.8	12/31/2005
San Diego City Employees' Retirement System <sup>c</sup>	4.0	1.0	79.9	6/30/2006
Alameda County Employees' Retirement Association	3.8	0.8	83.2	12/31/2005

<sup>a</sup> Largest defined benefit public pension programs (as reported by the State Controller), which include over 90 percent of all systems' assets.

<sup>b</sup> The system also presents funding information based on the market value of assets.

<sup>c</sup> Includes only assets and liabilities for the City of San Diego, one of three plan sponsors.

